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Abstract
Differences in local or regional public spending needs are a serious concern in many
countries, boosting the implementation of equalization grants. In order to quantify the
amount of grants, assessments of spending needs are needed. One standard technical
approach is to rely on econometric estimates of equations in which the dependent variable is
spending on the different services and the set of explanatory variables contains both proxies
standing in for factors determining spending needs and also control variables. While this is a
sound methodology, usual panel data estimators may be biased due to the low
within-variation of some observed and unobserved variables. This short paper shows this
potential problem and makes a methodological suggestion to overcome it: the use of a new
estimator for panel data with time-invariant regressors.
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1. Introduction 
 
Fiscal equalization is a key issue in federal countries
1. Regional disparities in 
fiscal capacities or spending needs claim for the design of an equalization grants system 
based on estimates of those disparities. Measuring differences in tax capacities (tax 
bases) uses to be easier than estimating differences in spending needs. The most usual 
technical approach in this second case is to rely on econometric estimates of equations 
in which the dependent variable is spending on service j and the set of explanatory 
variables contains both proxies standing in for factors determining spending needs and 
also control variables
2. While this is a sound methodology, usual panel data estimators 
may be biased due to the low within-variation of some observed and unobserved 
variables. This short paper shows this potential problem and makes a methodological 
suggestion to overcome it. 
 
2. The problem 
 
Per capita public spending on a given service in a given region can be 
decomposed as follows (Castells and Solé, 2000): 
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where S is public spending, P the population, U the number of users, I the total input 
and O the total amount of the service that is provided (output); u is the proportion of the 
                                                 
1 In fact, the problem is present in all countries insofar as those differences also may affect local 
governments. 
2 Among others, this approach has been used for Spain by Bosch and Escribano (1988), for the United 
Kingdom by Bramley (1990), for the United States by Ladd (1994), and for Canada by Shah (1996). An 
alternative approach is followed in Australia. Differences in spending needs and cost are evaluated in  
great detail by the Commonwealth Grants Commission using several methods (Williams, 1995)   1
population that uses the service, o the service provision per user, i the input required for 
each unit of service provided, and a the average unit cost of inputs.  
 
  Equalization of inter-regional differences in per  capita spending is only 
legitimate if higher spending is due to the percentage of the population who are users 
(u) being larger, to average inputs cost (a) being higher, or to productivity (i) being 
lower because of factors outside the control of the regional government, such as scale 
costs due to the population being smaller or more disperse. On the contrary, differences 
in per capita spending due to differences in preferences or efficiency in management 
should not be compensated. 
 
  Let us consider two regions (1 and 2) with the same population. In both regions 
identical individuals derive utility from net personal revenue y(1-t) –where y is revenue 
and t is the tax rate- and from a local public service (g) according to the following utility 
function for region i: 
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The public service does not affect productivity and tax bases. Assuming a constant 
marginal cost of g, government budget constraint is: 
i i i i i s y t g c + ⋅ = ⋅  
where c is the unitary cost of g, and s are the intergovernmental grants received. Then, 
regional governments choose t and g to maximize the utility level of individuals. 
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  The optimal levels of spending (g*1 and g*2) and taxes (t*1 and t*2) will be the 
same when c1 = c2; y1 = y2; s1 = s2; U1 (•)=U2 (•). Hence, divergences in regional public 
choices are explained by differences in marginal costs and in tax bases, but also by 
differences in preferences or efficiency. However, controlling the influence of the latter 
in econometric estimates is not easy, insofar as they use to be unobserved variables.  
 
If we work with panel data with a fairly small time span, one possibility might 
seem to be the inclusion of individual effects; for if the preferences and efficiency of the 
administration change relatively slowly then their influence can largely be treated as 
such. Note, however, that some of the variables usually employed in econometric 
estimates to represent differences in costs or needs (e.g. population, or demographic 
structure) also vary in time very much less markedly than between regions; or indeed do 
not change (area). This can cause multicollinearity problems if the individual effects 
modeling preferences and efficiency are treated as fixed. Let be x an explanatory 
variable with very small within-group variability and di a set of regional dummy 
variables accounting for individual fixed effects, each of which is unity for observations 
of x for the corresponding region and zero otherwise. Then x is very highly correlated 
with ii
i
dx ⋅ ∑ , where  i x  is the sample mean of x in region i. As pointed out by Beck 
(2001), there is a trade-off between the gains in precision from using individual fixed-
effects against the cost of not being able to asses the effect of time-invariant or rarely 
changing variables.  
 
This multicollinearity problem does not arise if the individual effects are 
modeled as random instead of fixed. But it requires to make the very often untenable   3
assumption that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other independent 
variables.  
 
In this point, we should test whether we really do need to take inter-regional 
differences in preferences and efficiency into account. Some light may be shed on this 
question by some simple simulations with cross-sectional data.  
  
Consider a 20-region nation in which regional spending needs S depend 
exclusively on a single variable, x (e.g. area, or population). If all regions have the same 
preferences, the same budget and the same efficiency in management, then there is 
perfect correlation between S and x: if both are expressed as percentages of their means 
and standardized, both variables have the same values and if S is then regressed on x 
(
* Sx β =⋅ ), R
2 and the slope β are both unity. Now represent proportional deviations in 
efficiency and preferences by random variables z1 and z2, so that actual spending S* is 
given by
*
12 SS z z =⋅⋅ and assume that x (and S) has a normal distribution with mean 
100 and standard deviation σ, and that z1 and z2 have normal distributions with mean 1 
and standard deviation σ'. While S would be the spending needed to provide a standard 
level of public services in region i, S* would be the spending observed and hence used 
in econometric studies with real data. 
  
Then examples of four different situations are obtained by generating 100 
samples (20-member each one) of N(100,σ) for σ = 1, 5, and 200 samples of N(1,σ') for 
σ' = 0.01 and 0.05. These samples are used to calculate corresponding samples of (S*, 
x), and then estimating the equation 
* Sx β = ⋅  in each case. Table 1 shows that the 
mistake in the estimate of β -the deviation from unity- increases both with increasing   4
inter-regional uniformity in x  and with increasing heterogeneity of preferences and 
efficiency.  
 
  It may be concluded that inter-regional differences in preferences and efficiency 
might only be confidently ignored in econometric estimates if such differences are 
proportionately very small compared to inter-regional heterogeneity in spending needs.  
 
 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the Parameter β for various 
combinations of σ and σ'. 100 Regressions have been estimated in each case 
  σ = 1  σ = 5 
σ' = 0.01  1.00  (0.29)  0.99  (0.07) 




3.  A suggestion 
 
A solution to this problem to be explored in future works is the use of the three-
stage estimator recently proposed by Plümper and Troeger (2005 and 2007). This 
estimator, called xtfevd, allows to simultaneously include time-invariant variables and 
individual fixed effects. Moreover, according to simulations carried up by authors, 
xtfevd outperforms the standard fixed effects model if the within variance of rarely 
changing variables is small and the between variance significantly larger. By using this 
estimator, the effect of four kind of variables may be simultaneously estimated when 
individual effects are not orthogonal to explanatory variables and random effects must 
be discarded: i)variables with a significant within-variation (e.g. per capita income), ii) 
rarely changing variables (e.g. population density), iii) observed time-invariant variables 
(e.g. area), and iv) unobserved time-invariant variables (e.g. preferences).   
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